Abstract-Remote User authentication scheme is commonly used for communication between authorized remote users over insecure network. Due to its simplicity and convenience, it is widely used in many environments such as E-commerce or remote host login. In recent years, several remote user authentication schemes using smart card have been proposed. Recently, Huang et al. proposed a timestamp-based user authentication scheme with smart card. They claimed that their scheme can resist off-line password guessing attack. However, there is some vulnerability Huang et al.'s scheme that we find their scheme cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack and it cannot detect the wrong password in login phase, and also insecure for changing the user's password in password change phase. In this paper, we conduct detailed analysis of flaws in Huang et al.'s scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid increasing need of the internet service and electronic commerce technology, user authentication schemes are an essential security requirement for protecting systems and networks. Especially, smart card authentication is that the most commonly used authentication method that authorized users can access the resources provided by remote servers. Due to its simplicity and efficiency, it is used many areas such as E-commerce environment or remote host login system.
Since Lamport [1] first proposed a remote password authentication protocol for the insecure channel in 1981, many remote user authentication schemes have been proposed [2] - [10] . However, most of these password authentication protocols have some flaws such as password guessing attacks, forgery attacks, replay attacks, insider attacks, impersonation attacks, stolen smart card attacks, parallel session attacks, etc.
Generally speaking, an outstanding smart card based password authentication scheme should satisfy some security requirements. Based on previous research, an ideal password authentication scheme using smart card should achieve the following goals such as  The server does not need to maintain a password table or verification table.  Allow users to freely choose and update password without communicating with the server.
 The remote user authentication schemes satisfy low communication cost and computation complexity.  The remote user authentication schemes should withstand different types of attacks.  Achieve mutual authentication between login users and remote servers. In 1999, Yang and Sheih [2] proposed a timestamp-based password remote user authentication scheme using smart card. In their scheme, users are free to choose and change their password. In 2003, Shen et al. [3] proposed a modified Yang and Sheih scheme, which resist the forge login attack and provide a mutual authentication.
However, Liu et al. [4] , Awasthi et al. [5] point out that Shen's scheme is still vulnerable to forged login attack. To surmount this shortcoming, Liu et al. [4] proposed a new improved scheme based on nonce. Also, Awasthi et al. [5] proposed an improved remote authentication scheme which still keeps the feature of the non-storage of data at server side.
Recently, Huang et al.'s [6] point out that Awasthi et al. 's scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack and proposed a timestamp-based user authentication scheme with smart-card. In Huang et al.'s scheme, they claimed that the remote server does not require any verification information for the users.
However, after careful analysis, we find their scheme cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack and it cannot detect the wrong password in login phase, and also insecure for changing the user's password in password change phase. In this paper, we demonstrate this security problem with Huang et al.'s timestamp-based user authentication scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, a brief review of the Huang et al.'s scheme [6] is given. In Section III, we show the vulnerabilities of the Huang et al.'s timestamp-based user authentication scheme. At the end, we draw our conclusion in Section IV.
II. REVIEW OF HUANG ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we examine the timestamp-based user authentication scheme with smart-card proposed by Huang et al.'s in 2013. Huang et al.'s scheme consists of four phases: the initialization phase, the registration phase, the login and authentication phase, the password change phase.
The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table I . 
A. Initialization Phase

B. Registration Phase
The registration phase is described in Fig. 1 . A new user Ui register with the server S by performing the following steps: 1) U i sends his/her identifier ID i and password PW i to KIC through a secure channel. 2) Upon receiving the ID i and PW i , the KIC calculates smart card's identifier
, where f ( ) is a one way function. 3) KIC stores {n, e, S i , ID i } into a smart card and then issues this smart card to user U i through a secure channel
C. Login and Authentication Phase
The login and authentication phase is described in Fig. 2 . When user U i wants to login and authenticate to server S, the following operation will perform: 1) User U i inputs his/her password PW i and calculates X i and Y i as follows:
where T c is the current date/timestamp in the user U i . 2) User U i sends the login request messages M = {ID i , n, e, T c , Y i } to the server S After the message M is received at time T s , the server S and the smart card execute the following operations: 
if there are satisfied, the server S accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request is rejected. 3) Then server S calculates R = (f (ID i , T s ') ) d mod n, and send M ' = {R, T s '} to user U i , where T s ' is the current timestamp in the server S. 4) After receiving the reply message M ' at time T c ', the user U i checks the timestamp T s ' in the received message with the condition |T s ' -T c '| < ΔT, where ΔT is the expected transmission delay. If this condition holds, the user U i accepts the login respond of S. Otherwise, terminates this procedure. 5) User U i calculates R' = R e mod n, and then checks the equation R' = f (ID i , T s '). If there are satisfied, the user U i accepts the server S. Otherwise, rejects the server S. 
D. Password Change Phase
The password change phase is described in Fig. 3 . The password change phase is performed without communicating the remote server S. In this phase, the user U i wants to his/her password PW i with as new password PW i ' by performing the following steps: 1) First, the user U i chooses a new password PW i '.
2) Calculate
3) Smart card replaces S i with S i ', which completes the password change.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF HUANG ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we will discuss the flaws of timestamp-based user authentication scheme with smart card. After careful analysis, we find that their scheme cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack and it has its inherent design flaws in the login phase that if the user U i inputs a wrong password, the login and authentication phased are still performed until it checked by the server S. Besides, their scheme has a weakness in password change phase. The details of these flaws are described follows.
A. Off-Line Password Guessing Attack
Offline password guessing attack [7] - [10] is that an attacker repeats a trial of a password candidate for all candidates until finding the correct password. In general, the attacker can easily obtain a user's password through off-line password guessing attack within a reasonable time limit, because users tend to set simple and brief passwords for their convenience.
In Huang et al.'s scheme, attacker can obtain the secrets {n, e, S i , ID i } in smart card after the attacker has stolen the smart card, and intercept Login request message {ID i , n, e, T c , Y i } between a user and the server. And then, the attacker tries to off-line password guessing attack by performing the following steps: 1) Attacker selects a password candidate PW * . 2) In login phase, Using X i
3) The attacker repeats above steps from 1 to 2 until the computed result Y i * equals the breached secret Y i . If they are equal, PW * = PW i , this means that attacker successfully obtain user's password by off-line password guessing attack.
B. Wrong Password Cannot Be Quickly Detected
In the login phase of Huang et al.'s scheme, if the user U i inputs his/her ID i and PW i , the smart card does not verify the validity of user's password in itself. Therefore, even if the user U i inputs his/her password incorrectly by mistake, the login and authentication phased are still performed until it checked by the server S. This leads to unnecessary waste a lot of communication and computation costs during the login and authentication phases. The detailed description is as follows:
Assume that the user U i inputs a wrong password PW i * in the login phase, then the smart card computes
where T c is the current date/timestamp in the user U i . Then, user U i sends the login request messages M = {ID i , n, e, T c , Y i * } to the server S After receiving the login request message M = {ID i , n, e, T c , Y i * }, the server S checks whether the ID i is a legitimate user or not, and then checks the timestamp T s in the received message with the condition |T s -T c | < ΔT, where ΔT is the expected transmission delay. Then, the server S calculates
if there are satisfied, the server S accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request is rejected.
It is obvious that
* ≠ Y i , therefore, the server S will reject U i 's login request.
From above demonstration, if the user U i inputs a wrong password in the login phase, it cannot be quickly detected. However, if the verification of the password change phase can be quickly checked in the beginning of the login phase, this situation will not happen and it will not lead to unnecessary waste a lot of communication and computation costs.
C. Weakness in Password Change Phase
When the smart card was stolen, unauthorized user can easily change new password of card in password change phase because of there is no validation of the old password.
In password change phase, au unauthorized user inserts U i 's smart card into a smart card reader, and then inputs the ID i and PW * , where PW * is unauthorized user's arbitrary new password, and requests to change the password.
After requesting a password change, unauthorized user inputs arbitrary new password PW * and then the smart card calculates S i * = S i ⊕ f (PW i ) ⊕ f (PW If an illegal user stole user U i 's smart card and change an arbitrary new password as above mentioned, then legal user U i succeeding login request will be rejected unless re-register with the remote server again. Therefore, Huang et al. 's password change phase is insecure.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 2013, Huang et al.'s proposed a timestamp-based user authentication scheme using smart card and demonstrated its resistance to off-line password guessing attack. However, in this paper, we point out their scheme cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack and it cannot detect the wrong password in login phase, and also insecure for changing the user's password in password change phase. We are working to improve the scheme by including suitable changes to surmount the shortcomings, which leads to the insecurity of the authentication scheme.
